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Consequences of the “War for Peace”1 
 
S R D J A  P A V L O V I C  
 
H I S T O R Y  A N D  M E M O R Y ,  O R  H I S T O R Y  O F  M E M O R Y  
The 1991 siege of the Croatian coastal city of Dubrovnik, which lasted 
nine months and had devastating consequences for the city and the entire 
region, at the time re-focused the world’s attention on the war in the 
former Yugoslavia. The events surrounding the earlier destruction of 
Vukovar by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and various Serbian 
paramilitary groups, coupled with the long-lasting and seemingly absurd 
attack on Dubrovnik, helped redefine the perception of the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia.2  
The varied assessments of the military operations in the region of 
Dubrovnik still provoke lengthy and passionate debates among historians 
and politicians, leaving many questions unanswered, while ordinary 
Montenegrins and Serbs are left to their own devices to cope with their 
feelings of uneasiness about the recent past. They struggle with questions 
such as who initiated the process and who is to blame for its catastrophic 
results? Was there a siege at all, or was the JNA advancing into Croatia 
in order to liberate its citizens from the “oppressive Ustasha regime” as it 
was claimed at the time by some of the more radical politicians in Serbia 
and in Montenegro? Whose soldiers besieged the city, Serbian or 
Montenegrin? Was there a shelling of Dubrovnik or was it all staged by 
local pyrotechnicians in order to mislead the international community into 
believing that the city fell victim to the Greater Serbian military 
invasion?3  
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Answers to these questions vary depending on whom you ask, how 
you pose a question, and why you ask it. In other words, answers are 
informed by differences in understanding the reasons behind the 
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and by different views of the internal 
dynamics of this process, all of which are shaped by strong emotional 
attachments to particular national paradigms. Even though in the case of 
the siege of Dubrovnik the available evidence provides answers to some of 
the questions posed, I am also conscious of the fact that this article is part 
of an ongoing debate on the causes of the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia. Therefore, the aim of this text is to present my own assessment 
of a specific episode of the Yugoslav conflict, while recognizing that my 
analysis may be in opposition to the predominant discourse. Discussing 
the siege of Dubrovnik and debating a number of issues is, I believe, the 
right point of departure in the process of facing the past and dealing with 
the consequences of earlier mistakes. 
This article will elaborate on the dynamics of the siege of Dubrovnik 
and analyze its political background and its implications. It will discuss 
the role Montenegrin political and military elites played in this conflict. 
My intention is to provide the necessary historical context for a better 
understanding of these events, as well as to problematize numerous 
discourses that have been applied in attempts to resolve the issue. I believe 
that the subject is much too important to remain hidden in the labyrinth of 
contemporary political bartering between Montenegro, Croatia, and the 
international community. I am also acutely aware of the fact that this 
essay is just a sketch of a much broader subject that begs further research. 
The following text is, in most part, based on evidence provided by 
numerous international organizations such as the UNESCO, various UN 
commissions of experts, and the EU Observer’s reports, as well as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague 
(ICTY). I have also examined secondary sources on the war in Croatia, 
both in English and Serbo-Croat, and also scrutinized numerous media 
reports of the period and critically evaluated their content. With regards 
to primary sources in Serbo-Croat, I would like to point out the scarcity of 
official documents related to political decision-making and military 
operations during the Dubrovnik campaign. This article also carries a 
mark of personal experience, since I lived in Montenegro at the time and 
followed the events on the ground very closely. The bulk of the research 
for this article was completed during months of preparation of the textual 
version of the historical account of the siege for the upcoming “OBALA” 
produced three-part TV documentary entitled “The War for Peace.”4  
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H I S T O R Y ,  P O L I T I C S ,  A N D  T H E  B A C K G R O U N D  O F  T H E  
C O N F L I C T  
“With God’s help, this time next year Dubrovnik will be the capital of 
Montenegro, and the Summer Games will be held in Niksic.”5 
Dubrovnik was founded in the mid-seventh century. For a long time it was 
under the protection of the Byzantine Empire, whose armies broke the 
fifteen-month long siege of Dubrovnik by the Saracens in 887. Some 
hundred years later, in 992, the Byzantine rulers acted again in support of 
Dubrovnik, after the city was burned down by the Bulgars. In the year 
1000, Dubrovnik recognized the authority of Venice, but in 1018 returned 
under the protective wing of the Byzantine Empire. In 1185 the Serb ruler 
Stefan Nemanja attempted to conquer Dubrovnik but without success. As 
the result of the peace treaty signed with Stefan Nemanja, Dubrovnik was 
granted the right to trade with the province of Raska (Ras). From 1205 to 
1358 the city was again under Venetian sovereignty, but after the signing 
of the Peace Treaty of Zadar in 1385, it became part of the Hungarian- 
Croatian Kingdom. Throughout the centuries and in spite of (or because 
of) foreign patronage, this city managed to preserve its independence.6 
During the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries Dubrovnik was a 
flourishing city-state with diplomatic representatives in Madrid and 
Rome. Dubrovnik especially prospered from the fifteenth to the eighteenth 
centuries and was Venice’s chief rival. In the sixteenth century Dubrovnik 
had a fleet of 200 large ships, which grew to 300 in the eighteenth century. 
Around 1780, ships from Dubrovnik sailed to New York and Baltimore. 
Throughout its history this city was the port of call on the Adriatic coast 
for merchants and politicians, as well as travelers, artists and tourists 
alike. Its rich cultural heritage attracted the attention of many.7 In 1806, 
the French army occupied the city and two years later Marshal Marmont 
abolished the Dubrovnik Republic and placed it under French rule. 
Following the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the city was annexed by Austria 
and remained part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the conclusion of 
the First World War. From 1918 to 1939 Dubrovnik was part of the 
Zetska Banovina (District) and from 1945 to 1990 of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.8 With its many medieval churches, cathedrals, and 
palaces from the Baroque period, the Croatian city of Dubrovnik (in 
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medieval times called Ragusa) is indeed the pearl of the Adriatic, and in 
1974 it was listed by UNESCO as a world heritage site.9 
The Old Town is contained in a small area. This dense urban space is 
confined by fortifications dating mainly from the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. The municipal regulation of 1272 dictated building standards 
and forms that were long respected. This regulation also softened the 
impact of changing architectural styles in the Mediterranean world. The 
reconstruction that followed the catastrophic earthquake of 1667 did not 
radically change the architectural character of the city. Dubrovnik 
engaged Italian architects, whose creations (even those of the Baroque 
period such as St. Blaise Cathedral and, to a lesser extent, the Jesuit 
church) would not clash excessively with the surrounding architecture. 
Igor Zidic rightly pointed out that in Dubrovnik, “it is not size that 
produces an illusion of order but rather order that produces an 
impression of size.”10 The Old Town is not only an architectural and 
urban ensemble of high quality, but it is also full of museums and libraries, 
such as the collection of the Ragusan masters in the Dominican Monastery, 
the Museum of the History of Dubrovnik, the Icon Museum, the libraries of 
the Franciscan and Dominican Monasteries, to mention but the most 
famous. Above all, it houses the archives of Ragusa. Kept continuously 
since the last quarter of the 13t h century, these archives are “the most 
important source for Mediterranean history” according to the French 
historian, Fernand Braudel.11  
In 1991, Dubrovnik was the center of a region encompassing 
approximately 979 square kilometers, stretching from the Prevlaka 
Peninsula (bordering Montenegro) to the Peljesac Peninsula. According to 
the 1991 census, over 71,000 people lived in the region of Dubrovnik, 
50,000 of whom lived in the city itself: 82.4 percent were Croats, 6.8 
percent were Serbs, and 4 percent were Muslims.12 The rest of the 
population was of mixed ethnic background due to mixed marriages and 
displayed elements typical for almost 20 different ethnic groups.  
As the former Yugoslavia fell apart during the early 1990s, with 
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia seeking independence, Dubrovnik captured 
the world’s attention once again. This time, however, this coastal city did 
not appear on the covers of newspapers around the globe on account of 
the splendor of its palaces or the opulence of its cultural artifacts. It was 
because Dubrovnik was under siege and artillery shells were falling onto 
the city. 
In early 1991, following the upswing of Greater Serbian nationalism 
epitomized by the policies of Slobodan Milosevic, other nationalist-
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minded elites in the former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and 
Bosnia opted for secession and sought independence, thus disturbing the 
fragile ethnic balance in the region and creating areas populated by the 
“unwanted other.”13 On June 25, 1991, Croatia seceded from the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and declared independence on 
October 8, 1991. What followed were years of bitter fighting for 
ideologies and territories between Serb and Montenegrin volunteers and 
paramilitaries coordinated and supplied by the Serb-controlled JNA on 
the one hand, and Slovene, Croat, and Muslim forces on the other.  
The legal aspects of the Dubrovnik campaign and the war in Croatia in 
general are still a matter of contention. Some Serbian and Montenegrin 
legal experts argue that the conflict was a civil war and an internal 
Yugoslav matter. It could also be argued that the Dubrovnik Campaign 
was an international conflict, considering that Croatia became an 
independent state on October 8, 1991, only eight days after JNA soldiers 
entered its territory. International recognition of Croatian independence 
indeed came much later, and this delay is often used as proof of the 
internal nature of the conflict around Dubrovnik. The legal finessing does 
not, however, diminish the fact that by the time of the JNA’s advance 
towards Dubrovnik, Croatia was not a constitutive element of the SFRY 
in any meaningful way.  Those who favor arguments along the lines of the 
so-called unconstitutional secession of Croatia should note that the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whose preservation was 
claimed to be the main reason for the armed conflict in Croatia, had 
already ceased to exist as a unified country, and its constitution was made 
null and void during the June 30, 1991 closed session of the Council for the 
Defense of the Constitution, when the Serbian representative, Borislav 
Jovic, announced that Serbia was in favor of Slovene secession.14 
Furthermore, the Federal Defense Secretary at the time, General Veljko 
Kadijevic, acknowledged that once the decision to let Slovenia go was 
reached, the JNA “would have to fight for the borders of a new 
Yugoslavia composed of those peoples who wanted to live together in it 
and who would not allow the disintegration of Yugoslavia as such.”15  
 In July and August of 1991, the military situation in Croatia worsened 
due to numerous attacks organized by various Serbian paramilitary 
forces supported by the JNA. On August 1, 1991, a coalition government 
was formed in Croatia under the presidency of Franjo Tudjman, and two 
weeks later the JNA intervened in Eastern Slavonia, with a massive 
attack on the Croatian town of Vukovar beginning on August 26. Further 
operations were carried out by the JNA in the Krajina region and along 
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the Dalmatian coast, where Croatian towns were blockaded from the sea. 
On September 25, 1991, the United Nations introduced an arms embargo 
on all the republics of the former Yugoslavia.16 At that time, the Yugoslav 
navy blockaded the southern coast of Dubrovnik, and the JNA deployed 
its forces along the border with Croatia. On September 23, 1991, the 
Croatian villages of Vitaljina, Brgat, and many others were subjected to 
intensive artillery shelling.  
With the generous assistance of the state-controlled media, 
Montenegrin officials argued that the country faced an immanent threat 
and used every opportunity to point out that Montenegro would defend 
itself by any means available. With regards to the military situation in 
Croatia and the former Yugoslavia in general, the government-controlled 
Montenegrin daily Pobjeda played a crucial role in “reminding” the 
citizens of Montenegro of the traditional notions of justice, honor, duty, 
historical right, and the “urgency” of defending the motherland against the 
forces of fascism and oppression. Any display of pacifism was interpreted 
as treason and an act of cowardice. The self-proclaimed leader of the SK-
Pokret za Jugoslaviju (League of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia) 
R. Krsmanovic, argued that “to be a pacifist at this time comes very close 
to surrendering to fascism in much the same manner as in 1941.”17 A month 
later, Krsmanovic’s views were reinforced by then Prime Minister Milo 
Djukanovic. In an interview with Pobjeda, the Montenegrin prime minister 
proclaimed that an attempt to promote the principle of voluntary service in 
the army was a big mistake because “when the motherland is in danger 
such a principle does not apply.”18 Djukanovic further stated that it is 
“patriots who are fighting because their state is put in jeopardy,” while he 
acknowledged opposition to the war as “some sort of abstract pacifism in 
the public sphere.”19 He also threatened all those reluctant to serve on the 
“threshold of homeland” with a special law that should be put in effect. 
This new law, according to Djukanovic, should introduce much harsher 
punishment for deserters, instead of simply “firing them from their jobs.”20 
Furthermore, the Montenegrin prime minister remarked that because of the 
Croatian chequered flag he would never again play chess.21 
Pobjeda’s 1991 editorials tried to explain the Yugoslav crisis in simple 
binary terms: the conflict between diplomacy and arms, which started in 
1991. “Croatia and Slovenia chose arms as the means for achieving their 
political goals. Under the veil of ‘the democratic process’ they secretly 
armed themselves, which clearly showed that the ‘young Croatian 
democracy’ was based on primitive nationalism and feudal, Jelacic-like 
stable boy attitude.”22 Such an approach to the Yugoslav crisis was 
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further elaborated on by leading Montenegrin politicians at the time. The 
deputy leader of the ruling DPS, Svetozar Marovic, saw the causes of the 
Yugoslav demise in “the continuity of an aggressive imperialist 
Catholicism, which viewed Yugoslavia as a marginal element and an 
episode in the process of acquiring larger realms of domination,” while 
“the current Croatian leadership, with its neo-fascism, its tendencies 
towards global militarization and its attempt to disguise genocide, 
represents one of the greatest dangers not only for the Yugoslav peoples 
but it is also a danger for Europe.”23 In his weekly column, Marovic also 
elaborated on the nature of Croatian history and its fundamental “flaws” 
commenting that it had to “re-invent itself in the heads of its militant 
nationalists since the bases for the Croatian state law are grand illusions 
and non-existent facts.”24 According to Marovic, the main stay of 
Croatian national politics was and continues to be “the demand for the 
destruction of Serbs in the areas of the so-called historical territories,” 
and such actions were to be carried out by “the force of arms and by 
slaughtering of the innocent.”25 
During the early fall of 1991 the political leaders of Montenegro and 
the military brass of the JNA rationalized the aggression on Dubrovnik as 
a necessary move towards protecting the territorial integrity of 
Montenegro and Yugoslavia and preventing a potential conflict along 
ethnic lines, as well as stopping the so-called unconstitutional secession 
of Croatia. Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic raised the hopes of 
many nationalists in Montenegro when he stated that the “Croatian 
authorities wanted to have a war and they will have it.”26 He continued 
by saying that “if Croatia wants to secede then the internal borders must 
be revised,” while interpreting the war in Croatia as an inevitable 
outcome of the totalitarian policies of Zagreb:  “One million Serbs in 
Croatia are deprived of their right and are forced to respond with arms.”27 
He assured the people of Montenegro that the time had come to “draw the 
demarcation lines vis-à-vis the Croats once and for all,” and that “the 
new borders with Croatia would be more logical and just than those 
drawn by the old and poorly educated Bolshevik cartographers.”28 
 
M I L I T A R Y  A N D  P O L I T I C A L  D Y N A M I C S  O F  T H E  S I E G E  
On September 16, 1991, the JNA issued a call for mobilization in 
Montenegro. The Command of the Titograd Corp ordered all conscripts 
and all those who were to provide material support and supplies in 
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livestock and were listed as members of War Unit No. 2277 to immediately 
proceed to a pre-designated location. The order stated: “Due to a sudden 
worsening of the overall political and security situation in the whole 
country, and in Croatia in particular, where the broader escalation 
occurred, the mobilization of War Unit No. 6247 in the Military Naval 
Sector Boka is also ordered.”29 The following day, the commander of the 
Titograd Corp addressed conscripts via Radio Niksic and explained the 
reasons behind this mobilization. Two days later, Pobjeda reported on 
this radio address and quoted the army commander’s justification for this 
action under a somewhat cynical title, “Mobilization for Defense.” 
According to Pobjeda, the Commander of the Titograd Corp appealed to 
every citizen of Montenegro “to fulfill their constitutional obligation and 
right to defend freedom, independence and territorial integrity, and defend 
the country whose foundations are threatened.”30 
It would seem that mobilization was not proceeding smoothly in spite 
of the brave face the authorities were trying to put on. Frequent criticism 
of deserters and pacifists in the media indicate that a considerable number 
of Montenegrins were reluctant to don a uniform and fight for an 
imaginary category such as the undying spirit of Serbhood. In order to 
further “motivate” the conscripts to join the fight for the preservation of 
their motherland, the Montenegrin People’s Party (closely allied with 
Slobodan Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia) called on its members to 
join the JNA. The leadership of the People’s Party reminded Montenegrins 
of all the “ills” caused by the former communist regime in Yugoslavia and 
appealed to their feelings of pride and of belonging to the larger Serbian 
family. Following the rhetoric of Greater Serbian expansionist 
nationalism, this proclamation referred to the need for defending “the 
Serbian territories within and outside the Montenegrin borders.”31 It also 
reminded the party faithful that “Montenegro’s glorious past determines 
the actions of Montenegrin patriots of today: coordinating interests of the 
Montenegrin people with the general interests of Serbdom,” while it 
characterized calls for the demilitarization of Montenegro as “calls for 
treason, hoped for by the HDZ likeminded people in Montenegro, and 
Kosovo and Metohija.”32 
The general public in Montenegro was further informed about the 
“dangerous silence” on the border with Croatia in an article entitled “The 
Guns are Silent,” by M. Vico, Pobjeda’s reporter on the ground.33 While 
confirming that there were no new developments on the Montenegrin 
border with Croatia and in the vicinity of the army barracks on Prevlaka 
Peninsula, Vico wrote about a tense standoff between the two sides. He 
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emphasized that the morale among the JNA troops was high and warned 
that if the Croatian “‘guards’ and ‘police’ dare to attack they will indeed 
regret it.”34 Two days later, he reported on the first exchange of fire and 
placed the blame for this incident squarely on the Croatian side. The 
Croatian forces allegedly fired from their camp in the village of Vitaljina. 
Judging by this report the JNA reservists responded with small arms fire, 
which according to Vico, was sufficient to “scare and silence the ‘guards’ 
on the other side.”35 It is interesting to note that until September 27 the 
government controlled media in Montenegro regularly used the phrase 
“border between Montenegro and Croatia.” From that point on, the 
language changed, and a new phrase was adopted: “the administrative 
border between Montenegro and Croatia.” The adjective “administrative” 
served the purpose of characterizing the border as a matter of form rather 
than substance. By not referring to it (or perceiving it) as a border 
between two states, the Montenegrin political leadership and the army 
brass were able to present to the outside world the subsequent JNA’s 
invasion of Croatia as an internal conflict and not as an international 
one.36 
In the wee hours of the morning of October 1, 1991, shortly after the 
JNA commander of the Military Naval Sector Boka, Admiral Krsto 
Djurovic, died under somewhat suspicious circumstances, JNA soldiers 
and reservists initiated military operations in the region of Konavle and 
around the Croatian coastal city of Dubrovnik.37 Just after 5:00 a.m. the 
people living in the Croatian village of Vitaljina and throughout the 
region of Konavle were awaken by heavy artillery fire coming from the 
JNA positions at Prevlaka Peninsula, Prijevor, Mojdez, and also from the 
JNA’s naval vessels anchored off the Croatian coast.38 The artillery fire 
was followed by an infantry thrust into Croatian territory. The bulk of 
these forces consisted of army reservists from Montenegro, whose crossing 
onto the Croatian territory was backed by planes, armor and artillery of 
the JNA.   
The JNA entered the region by several routes and began to move 
steadily northwest through Konavle toward the city of Dubrovnik. This 
action was coordinated with a similar, multiple-axis advance toward 
Dubrovnik through Primorje and the area known as Rijeka Dubrovacka 
(northwest of Dubrovnik). The JNA unit which later occupied the hills 
above Dubrovnik was the Third Battalion of the JNA 472 (Trebinje) 
Motorized Brigade, under the command of Captain First Class Vladimir 
Kovacevic – Rambo. For the purposes of the Dubrovnik campaign this 
battalion was attached to Military Naval Sector Boka with headquarters 
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in Herceg Novi, and was put under the overall command of the Vice 
Admiral Miodrag Jokic. The Third Battalion consisted of three 
sharpshooter (rifle) companies, one anti-tank company, one mixed-mortar 
company, and one tank detachment. It had the strength of approximately 
800 to 1000 personnel, with 50 per cent being professional JNA soldiers, 
while the rest were reservists from Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The other formations and units of the JNA, including the above-mentioned 
unit, as well as the forces of Naval Sector Boka that were involved in the 
Dubrovnik campaign were subordinated to the Second Operational 
Group. The commander of the Second Operational Group was Lieutenant 
General Pavle Strugar.39 The Second Operational Group headquarters 
was located at Trebinje (Bosnia and Herzegovina). With regards to the 
strength of the JNA forces that occupied the District of Dubrovnik, 
estimates range from 7,500 to 20,000 men.40 As soon as the JNA fired the 
initial artillery rounds at Konavle, the Montenegrin Ministry of Interior 
issued a secret order for the mobilization of the Special Police Unit that 
would assist the JNA in “carrying out combat operations in the conflict of 
war on the border between the Republic of Montenegro and the Republic 
of Croatia.”41 The then Montenegrin Minister of Interior, the late Pavle 
Bulatovic, signed the order. This unit was equipped with the necessary 
infantry weapons and medical provisions and put under the direct 
command of the assistant minister of the public security service, whose 
duty was to coordinate actions with “the operative command at the 
Dubrovnik theatre of war.”42  
While the JNA forces and the reservists from Montenegro were slowly 
advancing towards Dubrovnik on October 4, 1991, the government of 
Serbia was in session. The the fighting in the Dubrovnik region was 
discussed as was the manner in which the government of Serbia should 
position itself with regards to those developments. The result of the debate 
was a letter issued by the Serbian government on October 5, 1991, and 
sent to the government of Croatia. The contents of the letter, signed by the 
Serbian Prime Minister at the time, Dragutin Zelenovic, indicated Belgrade 
officially distancing itself from the Dubrovnik campaign, but it also 
accused the Croatian government of provoking bloodshed. Claiming 
Dubrovnik as part of Serbian, as well as Croatian heritage, the 
government in Belgrade blamed its counterparts in Zagreb for sending 
“paramilitary units, Black Legions, and numerous foreign mercenaries,” 
into the city and then “launching attacks on settlements in Herzegovina 
and Boka Kotorska.”43 The Serbian government characterized this alleged 
military deployment as “a totally uncivilized, inhuman, and undignified 
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act,” and expressed its firm belief that “all the members of the Yugoslav 
Army and units of the Territorial Defense will make an efforts in protect 
this historical town.”44 
The rhetoric of this letter served many purposes. First, it blamed the 
Croatian authorities for provoking the conflict, but it also absolved JNA 
units of any responsibility for destruction that might occur in Dubrovnik. 
The alleged installment of “paramilitary units, Black Legions, and 
numerous foreign mercenaries” portrayed Dubrovnik as a legitimate 
military target and characterized the Croatian power structure as 
insensitive to the potential suffering of its people.45 Second, it tried to 
demonstrate to the international community the peaceful intentions of the 
Serbian leadership despite facing Croatian politicians who were bent on 
war “at all costs.” Third, the letter was aimed at portraying the 
government of Serbia only as an interested third party that had nothing to 
do with the events on the ground. Because it had been “acquainted with 
the danger to the civilian population and the city of Dubrovnik,” the 
government in Belgrade could not, it was claimed, be held responsible for 
the outcome of the whole affair.46 In time, such distancing would lead to 
characterization of the Dubrovnik campaign as entirely Montenegrin 
operation. 
The leadership of Montenegro immediately followed this cue and 
convened a joint extraordinary session of its parliament and its 
government on October 7, 1991. The discussion was focused on the issue 
of negotiating the future status of the Prevlaka Peninsula with the Croats 
and was based on an earlier proposal to rectify the border so that 
Prevlaka could become Montenegrin.47 A communiqué issued on October 8, 
1991, stated that “Montenegro is not at war with the Republic of Croatia, 
nor has it any pretensions toward its territory.”48 The Montenegrin 
leadership further stated that reservists from Montenegro were members 
of the Yugoslav Army, and that the JNA “was the only instance 
responsible for their deployment.”49 It should not be forgotten that those 
lines were written while the Montenegrin reservists, its police force, and 
various paramilitary units under the overall command of the JNA were 
advancing through Konavle towards Dubrovnik. The self-confessed 
author of this communiqué, the former Foreign Minister of Montenegro, 
Nikola Samardzic, acknowledged recently that its content “was in 
contradiction with the actual state of affairs because war was being 
waged on Dubrovnik and a march further on towards Karlobag was 
being planned.”50 The Speaker of the Croatian Parliament responded on 
October 15, 1991, with a letter to the President of the Montenegrin 
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Assembly, Risto Vukcevic, agreeing to meet with the representatives of 
Montenegro and continue the dialogue with Podgorica, in hope that peace 
and good neighborly relations could be re-established, but he also 
emphasized that “the atmosphere for discussion and dialogue would have 
been more favorable had your initiative appeared before the aggression on 
the Republic of Croatia from the territory of Montenegro.”51 The planned 
meeting never happened, and Nikola Samardzic asserted that it was 
Milosevic who dismissed the Montenegrin initiative.52 
The political game played by Podgorica at the time was apparent in an 
interview that the Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic gave to 
Pobjeda a few days before this extraordinary joint session. Despite the 
peace-oriented rhetoric in the official communiqué, in the interview the 
prime minister argued passionately in favor of war as the only solution 
for the current conflict on the border with Croatia because “partners in 
this dialogue on the Croatian side are Ustashas, cynics, crazed and blood 
thirsty criminals – in a word – mercenaries whose mission is to destroy 
the Yugoslav state.”53 He refused to acknowledge the fact that it was the 
JNA that launched an attack on Dubrovnik and not the other way around, 
and was firm in his belief that “Ustasha formations are threatening 
Montenegro and its citizens in the most direct way.”54  
Contrary to the picture of doom presented by the Montenegrin 
politicians, army brass and the government-controlled media in 
Montenegro, the fact remains that the presence of the Croatian forces in 
the District of Dubrovnik in September 1991 was almost non-existent. A 
small unit armed with light weapons were guarding the Imperial Fort on 
Mount Srdj that was built during the Napoleonic period. This platoon 
was stationed about one kilometer up Mount Srdj above the Old Town of 
Dubrovnik. There were no other regular Croatian army units present in 
the region. The resistance to the JNA’s advance was insignificant. 
Croatian President Stjepan Mesic remarked that “because of geopolitics it 
was impossible to organize a serious defense of Dubrovnik. Croatia 
didn’t have forces able to stop the Yugoslav Armada.”55 Numerically 
small, poorly armed, and hastily formed units of “home guard” composed 
of men from the Croatian police and former members of Croatian descent 
who had deserted the JNA were no match for the armor of the JNA. The 
form of their resistance was such that there was no frontline distinction 
between the JNA and Croatian forces – only the edge of the area up to 
which the JNA had advanced at any given point in time. As Petar Poljanic, 
the former Mayor of Dubrovnik, stated during his testimony at the trial of 
Slobodan Milosevic, the Montenegrin media, its politicians, and high 
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ranking JNA officers made a concerted effort at misrepresenting the 
military situation on the ground and exaggerated the “threat” of an attack 
on Montenegro by “30,000 armed Ustashas and 7000 terrorists, including 
Kurdish mercenaries. We had no mercenaries in our army. There was one 
foreigner, a Dutchman, who was married to a lady from Dubrovnik and 
who was there during the war. He volunteered to join the Croatian 
army.”56 A similar account was given by the former Montenegrin Foreign 
Minister, Nikola Samardzic, during his testimony at the trial of Slobodan 
Milosevic. Speaking about the October 1, 1991 extraordinary session of 
the government of Montenegro, Samardzic elaborated on the issues 
discussed. 
I was quite shocked, but what was said was that Croatia had started to 
attack Montenegro, and that 30,000 Ustashas were ready to advance 
upon Montenegro and to take control of Boka, and that it was up to us to 
defend ourselves. That's what President Bulatovic said and this was 
borne out by General Strugar… This was commonly thought in the 
government and by the people. Many people believed that we had been 
attacked because there was enormous propaganda along those lines 
favoring war.57 
The immediate reason for the absence of any significant Croatian military 
presence in the region could be attributed to the fact that the Croatian 
authorities' assessment of the threat to this district was inaccurate. 
Certainly, the proportion of Serbs in this area was relatively low. 
Furthermore, the military authorities in Belgrade had affirmed that there 
were no plans to attack Dubrovnik. In addition, the District of Dubrovnik 
(apart from the Prevlaka Peninsula) had long before been largely 
demilitarized. The last regular army unit of any significance located in the 
District of Dubrovnik was moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1968, 
and the territorial defense armament was transferred in 1972 to Duzi and 
Grab, also in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
At that time, the members of the European Commission Monitoring 
Mission (ECMM) arranged for representatives of the JNA forces and the 
city of Dubrovnik to meet in order to negotiate a cease-fire that would 
enable the necessary repairs to public utilities system and also facilitate 
prisoner exchanges. These negotiations and cease-fire arrangements had 
no real effect upon the advance of the JNA toward the city of Dubrovnik.  
It is interesting to note that the JNA forces entered Croatia from the 
northwest at the beginning of October 1991. Even though the JNA 
experienced negligible resistance, its troops did not follow the same 
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timetable as those JNA forces advancing from the southeast. The troops 
marching into Croatia from the northwest did not occupy their final 
positions around the city of Dubrovnik until approximately November 24, 
1991. For almost a month these JNA troops halted their advance even 
though their comrades-in-arms coming from the southeast had brought 
their gun positions to the very edge of the city and a Yugoslav federal flag 
was hoisted on Zarkovica promontory on October 26, 1991.58  
There may have been several reasons for this pause. First, from the 
beginning of October 1991, JNA forces had gained control of several 
strategically important locations on the border of Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This, in turn, effectively blocked access to Dubrovnik by 
land from the northwest. By sea, the city was blockaded by the Yugoslav 
navy. Considering these factors, it would appear that the JNA was in no 
hurry to reach the city gates from the northwest. The international 
significance of the Dubrovnik region might have been yet another factor 
contributing to a relatively slow advance of the JNA. Furthermore, the 
international community had put in place proposals that would limit the 
scope of the JNA’s territorial expansion in the region. The Kouchner Plan, 
announced on November 19, 1991, called for JNA forces advancing from 
the northwest to stop at the village of Mokosica. These troop movements 
were to be monitored by representatives of the ECMM. The Kouchner 
Plan was followed by the Geneva Agreement of November 23, 1991, which 
also aimed at halting further troop advance into the Croatian coastal 
region. However, both of these agreements were violated as soon as they 
became effective. 
The Imperial Fort on Mount Srdj above the city and the 
telecommunications tower next to it, as well as Zarkovica hill and the 
Ploce district (in the southeast of the city) were shelled on October 1, 
1991, and again the following day. On October 3, the JNA shelled the 
Hotel Belvedere (in which there was a Croatian military post), and its 
aircraft dropped bombs in the sea near the Hotel Argentina.59 The Old 
Town was hit with 120-millimeter mortar fire and 82-millimeter rockets 
for the first time on October 23, 1991. The front sections of the Small Port 
in the southeast of the Old Town and the houses along the Stradun were 
hit by these projectiles, as were the St. John Fort and St. Peter's Bastion, 
which were being used as shelters. Among notable monuments hit were the 
Sponza Palace, the Jesuit Church, the Franciscan Bell Tower, and the 
Town Clock Tower. A home for the elderly south of the St. Claire 
Monastery and the city wall behind it were also hit by mortar fire. The 
location of these impacts was such that UNESCO observers concluded 
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that the bombardment had come almost entirely from the southeast. Two 
days later, the JNA representatives presented an ultimatum to the 
Dubrovnik crisis committee and the ECMM representatives. The JNA 
demanded the disarmament of the city and the immediate departure of all 
Croatian military forces and “foreign mercenaries,” as well as the 
removal of the public officials who had been elected during the previous 
free elections.60  
The renewed shelling of the city on October 30, 1991, resulted in six 
civilian casualties, while mortar fired on the hotel complex at Babin Kuk, 
on November 2, 1991, wounded several refugees housed there temporarily. 
Even though the JNA forces either had or ought to have had knowledge of 
the presence of thousands of refugees in these hotels, it would seem that the 
hotels in the New Town of Dubrovnik were deliberately targeted during 
the fall of 1991. Over the next couple of days, the Old Town was subjected 
to small arms and sniper fire, killing one civilian on the Stradun 
(Promenade in the Old Town). On November 7, a new ultimatum was 
announced on local radio, demanding that all Croatian forces surrender 
by noon. The following day, JNA commander Vice Admiral Jokic 
announced that the Croatian forces had rejected the ultimatum and that he 
would spare only the Old Town. On November 9, the Imperial Fort, Gruz, 
and Lapad were bombarded. The following day, the Imperial Fort was hit 
again, as were the Hotel Belvedere, the Excelsior Hotel, the Hotel 
Argentina and the Old Town. Naval vessels participated in this 
bombardment. The bombardment culminated in November in the systematic 
destruction, by wire-guided missiles, of every yacht in the harbor of the 
old city.61  
According to a report by the ECMM, the selection of JNA targets on 
December 6 changed somewhat. The heavy shelling was directed towards 
the northwestern part of the Old Town. The Franciscan Convent, the 
buildings near the Stradun and buildings in the area southwest of the 
Stradun received heavy mortar fire. This bombardment not only struck the 
Old Town but also burned down the Inter-University Center along with 
its library of 20,000 volumes. During the Battle of Dubrovnik, 82 to 88 
civilians were killed. The circumstances surrounding some of these deaths 
appear to be particularly disturbing. The deaths of firemen at the Libertas 
Hotel in the New Town of Dubrovnik on December 6, 1991, while they 
were fighting a fire appear to have been the result of a specific target by 
JNA forces. This is confirmed by the recording of a JNA radio 
transmission, which gave the order to direct mortar fire on the firemen. 62 
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The invasion of the District of Dubrovnik by the JNA resulted in a 
large number of its residents seeking refuge within the confines of the city 
walls. These refugees numbered approximately 15,000, and most of them 
took shelter in the numerous hotels in the New Town (west of the Old 
Town). Approximately 7,000 refugees were evacuated by sea in October 
1991. These evacuations became more difficult as the siege progressed, but 
negotiations with the JNA carried out by international organizations, 
such as the ICRC and UNICEF, with the assistance of Croatian 
humanitarian organizations and the local crisis committee, ensured that a 
further 9,000 persons (mainly pregnant woman, mothers with small 
children, the elderly and the sick), were able to leave by sea. The available 
evidence suggests that (even more so than in Konavle) the minuscule 
resistance to the southeastward advance of the JNA forces and the paucity 
of any valid military objectives in Primorje were such that many of the 
civilian injuries and casualties (which were significantly higher in 
Primorje than in Konavle) and much of the destruction of civilian property 
during this advance was not militarily necessary. It has been estimated 
that in the region of Dubrovnik, including the Old Town, 11,425 buildings 
were damaged (some more than others) by artillery fire and bombardment. 
As a result of the district's electrical grid being bombed by JNA forces, 
electricity and water to the city were lost on October 1, 1991. Except for 
those few people who had generators, the citizens of Dubrovnik lived 
without electricity until the end of December 1991.63  
The JNA reservists not only forced people from their houses, but also 
engaged in massive looting, pillaging, and the destruction of private and 
historical property. It is hard to imagine how the looting and desecration 
of the Franciscan Monastery of St. Jerome in Slano or the destruction of 
parts of the old Arboretum of Trsteno can be anything but two glaring 
examples of destructive acts which were not militarily necessary.64 Heavy 
looting occurred in Kupari, where the hotel complex Vrtovi Sunca was 
virtually cleaned out of all its furniture and equipment, pieces of which 
were later either sold on the black market in Montenegro or given as 
“gifts” to various state-run institutions and organizations in Podgorica. 
In late October 1991 the author of this article personally witnessed the 
forceful presentation of one such  “gift” from Kupari to the Director of the 
Clinical Center “Vukasin Markovic” in Podgorica. Six heavily armed 
reservists came to the main hospital entrance, unloaded three leather sofas 
and two leather armchairs, and while proudly displaying their sub-
machine guns, knives, and other kind of “peace-making” equipment, 
literally scared the hospital director into accepting the stolen property as 
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their generous “donation” for his office. Even though there were numerous 
individual soldiers and paramilitaries involved in looting and pillaging, it 
has been alleged that the spoils of war were collected in an organized 
fashion by the army. The former Foreign Minister of Montenegro, Nikola 
Samardzic, described these activities as robbery that was made to look 
like damage incurred during fighting. 
They would take out valuables from houses, such as television sets, 
household appliances, etc. and then throw a hand-held rocket or 
something to destroy the house completely and destroy all the traces of 
looting. Make it look like damage incurred in the war.” 65 
One of the lesser known, but nonetheless disturbing case of well-
organized looting occurred in Cavtat shortly after the JNA overtook the 
town.  According to reports by Pobjeda, on October 16, 1991 at 11:00 a.m. 
and “after learning that the Ustasha formations left the town, the Special 
Forces unit of the JNA, followed by infantry and motorized JNA units, 
entered Cavtat. This action was completed without a single bullet being 
fired.”66 What this report failed to mention was that after the JNA 
soldiers and reservists entered Cavtat they were ordered by one of their 
commanding officers to enter the Vlaho Bukovac Memorial Museum. Every 
single work of art displayed and stored in this museum was first neatly 
packed and then loaded up on army tracks to be taken to Montenegro as 
“spoils of war.” After the information about this robbery reached 
European capitals in late 1992, a special committee was formed in London 
with the aim of pressuring the Montenegrin government into returning 
those works of art back to Cavtat. This committee, among others, included 
Nikola Patrovic, the descendant of the last Montenegrin king, Francisca 
von Habsburg, and Franz Muheim, the former Swiss Ambassador to the 
Great Britain.67 
In spite of its advantages in manpower and equipment the JNA did not 
succeed in forcing the surrender of Dubrovnik. Considering the strength 
and capabilities of the JNA at the time, the question remains why its forces 
did not take the city. It would seem reasonable to assume that events in 
The Hague and in Belgrade overtook the ambitions of the Serbian and 
Montenegrin expansionists, and in May 1992, with the truce in Croatia 
already five months old, the Croats reached an agreement with the JNA. Its 
forces lifted the siege and withdrew from the area.  
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D R E A M S  O F  C O N Q U E S T  A N D  R E A L I T Y  O F  
R E C O N C I L I A T I O N  
As the negotiations concerning the lifting of the siege were approaching 
their final phase, it was clear that this campaign had been a military 
fiasco for the JNA. It also turned into a public relations nightmare for the 
political leaderships in Podgorica and Belgrade. A growing number of 
Montenegrins questioned the motives behind the campaign. Judging by the 
way the Dubrovnik campaign was covered in the Serbian press, some 
speculated about the true intentions of the attack on Dubrovnik. Dragan 
Veselinov, professor at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade, argued 
in 1991 that the JNA had found itself in an awkward position and 
without an exit strategy because it neither dared to openly rule 
Dubrovnik, “nor use it as a trump card against Milosevic in the 
negotiations. Milosevic might even curse the day Dubrovnik was attacked, 
since many will attribute it only to him and not to his generals.”68 He 
criticized the army for poor decision-making skills and questioned its 
devotion to “protecting the Serbs in Croatia.”69 
By questioning the rationale behind the campaign, Veselinov alleged a 
high level of disunity and a lack of coordination between the political 
leaderships in Podgorica and Belgrade and the JNA. While problematic on 
many levels, Veselinov’s assessment of the situation framed one of the 
main points of contention with regards to the siege of Dubrovnik: was the 
Dubrovnik campaign planned and executed without the approval of 
Slobodan Milosevic? His comments squarely placed the blame on the JNA 
generals and not on Milosevic. While one could agree with Veselinov that 
Milosevic might not have been involved in the operational aspects of the 
Dubrovnik campaign, proving that “his generals” dared to besiege the city 
without his tacit approval would be a daunting task. Veselinov’s 
statement served yet another purpose: to minimize the negative impact of 
the Dubrovnik campaign on Serbian political structures. This, in turn, 
was a deception of both the general public in Serbia and Montenegro, and 
the international community. Twelve years later, it became clear that the 
actions of the JNA around Dubrovnik were not the case of a group of 
disobedient generals going astray, but part of the broader political 
strategy of expansionist nationalism employed by the Montenegrin 
leadership.  
While the onslaught on Dubrovnik was underway and the 
international community was strongly objecting to its aim and scope, the 
military brass and the politicians in Montenegro acted on different fronts 
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to remedy the situation. They tried to justify their actions to the 
Montenegrin citizens by claiming that this military campaign, even though 
it entailed crossing into Croatian territory, was defensive in nature, and 
in so doing further inflamed the nationalist sentiments among the 
population. Bozidar Babic, the Montenegrin Defense Minister at the time 
,talked about patriotism and the sacred duty of every Montenegrin to 
defend Yugoslavia. He wondered if one “really has to ask why step 
outside the Montenegrin borders? Should we leave the JNA soldiers and 
all those who wish to live together at the mercy of the Ustasha beasts? 
The borders to be defended are wherever a single soldier of ours, a soldier 
of the JNA, is attacked.”70 Moreover, Branko Kostic, the interim President 
of the SFRY Presidency, had warned earlier that Montenegro would 
defend itself, and “it would do that not only within its own borders.”71 
After the lifting of the siege in May 1992, Svetozar Marovic justified the 
involvement of Montenegrin reservists and police forces in the aggression 
on Dubrovnik by saying that it was not possible to secure peace in any 
other way, and that Montenegro was “unable to influence the beginning of 
the war. It was imposed by Croatian egoism.”72  
On the one hand, the politicians in Podgorica and Belgrade also had 
broader concerns about the reaction of the international community to the 
manner in which the former Yugoslavia dissolved. Until the attack on 
Dubrovnik, Serbia was the sole proprietor of the title “Defender of 
Yugoslavia” while Montenegro for the most part stood aside. Montenegro 
was involved in the initial phases of the war in Croatia only to the extent 
that allowed its soldiers to be recruited to the JNA.73 Its enthusiastic 
participation in the onslaught on Dubrovnik raised questions about 
personal gains for the Montenegrin politicians.74 On the other hand, the 
“newly elected” Montenegrin leadership needed to strengthen its grip on 
power and it chose to accomplish that by demonstrating its loyalty to its 
mentor in Belgrade. The prospects of territorial expansion indeed found 
fertile ground in Montenegro. Novak Kilibarda, then leader of the pro-
Milosevic People’s Party, and many other supporters of Greater Serbian 
nationalism in Montenegro were hoping that the military incursion into 
Croatia would realize their dreams of “reclaiming” a long lost territory: 
the so-called Serbian Republic of Dubrovnik. In late summer 1991, Novak 
Kilibarda was a passionate advocate of attacking Dubrovnik  because 
“in order to save those Serbs who would be slaughtered by Ustashas, we 
need to hit from the south, from underneath, and force Croatia to fight us 
there!”75 With the passage of time, however, attitudes changed and, in the 
summer of 2003, not without a healthy dose of cynicism, Kilibarda claimed 
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that, at the time, he has been manipulated by the biased media reports: “I 
was confused after hearing about 30,000 Ustashas on the move! TV 
Belgrade and Montenegrin TV provided the news and I, like a child, was 
frightened… Imagine how others felt when even I, a university professor, 
fell for it.”76 Some Montenegrin politicians, however, remained proud of 
their actions in 1991. On October 1996, the former President of 
Montenegro, Momir Bulatovic, reminded the general public that “the day 
after the first ecological state in the world was established, boys wearing 
JNA uniforms crossed the border of the Republic of Montenegro in order 
to legitimately defend the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We 
were the party that stood behind both of those actions.”77 More recently, 
General Momcilo Perisic, the former Chief of the JNA General Staff and a 
person responsible for the initial shelling of the Bosnian city of Mostar, 
stated recently that it was Stjepan Mesic who “was shelling Dubrovnik 
and was responsible for the conflict in Mostar.” Perisic further claimed 
that Mesic did this “so that he could later accuse Serbs of everything that 
happened.”78 
The politicians in Belgrade thought that the engagement of Montenegro 
in trying to achieve what were effectively Serbian war aims would have a 
positive effect on international public opinion and policy makers. Their 
intentions were twofold. First, to demonstrate that the war in Croatia and 
military activities of the Serb-controlled JNA throughout the former 
Yugoslavia in general were not guided by the selfish interests of Serbia 
but were aimed at protecting the interests of all citizens of the former 
Yugoslavia and at saving the federal state. Once the negative consequences 
of the “War for Peace” became clear, the political leadership in Belgrade 
tried to distance itself from it, claiming that the Dubrovnik Campaign had 
nothing to do with Serbia but had been solely inspired by Montenegro and 
its desire for territorial expansion. In the face of the overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary, many politicians and intellectuals in Serbia still 
adhere to such a view. Second, to distract the world’s attention from the 
events that took place around the city of Vukovar and gain the time needed 
to re-design a message to the international community about Serbia and 
Montenegro fighting hand-in-hand against the so-called retrograde 
political forces in the region. It is worth remembering that at the outset of 
the Yugoslav crisis some segments of the international community (Russia, 
for example) had shown sympathy for Serbian war aims.  
The overall strategy was, and remains to this day, to minimize the 
importance of the Dubrovnik campaign, distort analyses of its nature, and 
dispute reports about large-scale destruction of property and civilian 
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casualties.79 In the early 1990s, such efforts varied from complete denial of 
the JNA’s involvement to nationalistic rationalizations of the attack. JNA 
spokesman Yugoslav Army Colonel Milan Gvero, the man who earlier 
masterminded the grotesque media tour of “liberated” Vukovar, dismissed 
reports of Dubrovnik’s destruction and claimed that the Croats were 
setting fire to piles of burning car tires. In the face of the overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary, Gvero claimed that “Not a single speck of dust 
has fallen on Dubrovnik.”80 On the other side of the spectrum, a prominent 
Serbian historian and member of the Serbian Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, the late professor Radovan Samardzic, showed little sympathy 
for Dubrovnik. For him, it was “a city of hotel owners who prostitute 
themselves and a place where American grannies, British homosexuals, 
stupid Frenchmen, and German secretaries come for a holiday. Anyhow, 
southeastern Europe is almost a colony of German secretaries.”81  
At present, the assessments and justifications of the Dubrovnik 
campaign differ somewhat from those expressed in 1991-2. During the last 
couple of years, and despite a number of unresolved issues, political and 
diplomatic relations between Croatia and Montenegro have seemingly 
improved. The earlier contested claims over the Prevlaka Peninsula, which 
seem to have been the immediate reason for the conflict, now appear 
settled. Croatia recently gained complete control over the area, the border 
crossing with Montenegro at Prevlaka Peninsula has reopened and Croat 
authorities are planning to develop the area as a tourist resort. There is 
also a tendency among the Montenegrin political and military elites to 
view this relationship as normalized, thus implying that past conflicts are 
now over and earlier contested issues are settled. Montenegrin politicians 
argue that it is not necessary to revisit this episode because reopening it 
would only prove detrimental to the ongoing process of reconciliation. It 
would seem that the Croatian authorities feel comfortable with such 
arrangements especially since they regained the territory initially lost 
during the conflict in the Dubrovnik region and, more importantly, they 
now occupy the moral high ground vis-à-vis Montenegro.82  
Revisiting the issue of the 1991 siege of Dubrovnik is, therefore, 
crucial for a number of reasons. Above all, it is important in the context of 
the much-needed process of a multi-leveled reconciliation in the region: 
within Montenegro, and between Montenegrins and their Croat 
neighbors.  
From the outset of the Yugoslav crisis, Montenegro was a divided 
society. In the early 1990s the lines of division within Montenegro were 
drawn not only by the political views and party affiliation of its citizens 
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but also by their attitude towards the Dubrovnik campaign. A numerically 
small but vocal minority that rallied around the Citizens’ Forum of 
Montenegro and the magazines Monitor and Liberal opposed the campaign. 
The structures of power in Montenegro treated these Montenegrin 
refusniki as not only traitors and enemies of the state, but also as 
individuals who were not worthy of calling themselves Montenegrin. 
Confronting the mistakes from the past and clearly identifying political 
and military responsibilities for this disastrous campaign should 
therefore ease the tensions within Montenegro and lift the “burden of 
guilt” from all those who in 1991 advocated restraint.83 This is long and 
arduous process and the political elite in Montenegro is not yet willing to 
confront these demons from the past.  
The politicians in Podgorica and Belgrade repeatedly claim that 95 per 
cent of Montenegrins in some way participated in this campaign. They 
play this numbers game for selfish reasons. The Serbian political elite still 
adheres to the view of the Dubrovnik campaign as an adventure induced 
and organized by the Montenegrin political elite. The leadership in 
Podgorica resorts to generalizations in order to avoid answering 
questions about individual responsibility (political or otherwise). Both 
are hoping that, once the trials of the army brass in The Hague are over 
and sentences passed, the issue of individual responsibility for the 
political decisions would somehow evaporate into thin air.  
The argument that the masses can be manipulated if they are 
susceptible to manipulation is indeed to a certain extent valid.  Belgrade-
based sociologist, Zagorka Pesic-Golubovic, is a forceful advocate of such 
a view. Moreover, the former Mayor of Belgrade, Bogdan Bogdanovic, 
went a step further and suggested that criminal intent with regards to the 
treatment of “others” was imprinted onto the Serbian psyche long before 
the actual conflict in the former Yugoslavia started.84 While not disputing 
the fact that a significant number of Montenegrins and Serbs gladly joined 
the Dubrovnik campaign, I would argue that instead of debating the issue 
of collective responsibility and implying the existence of violence as a 
character trait (being violent), it is prudent to first analyze the nature of 
the expansionist nationalism among the South Slavs and elaborate on the 
internal dynamics of the process of becoming violent.85 
The attempts of the political elites to evenly distribute the 
responsibility for the Dubrovnik campaign seem to be a self-serving 
exercise. Such rhetoric is aimed at de-personalizing guilt and unjustly 
spreading it among the entire population of Montenegro, while leaving the 
wrong impression of Montenegrins as spellbound by the notion of 
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“collective guilt.” This impression is, however, imposed from above and 
has little to do either with the way the Montenegrin general public feels 
about the siege of Dubrovnik or with the widely discussed issue of 
reconciliation. It is worth repeating that the political elites who advocate 
such depersonalization are the same elites who were in power in 
Montenegro during the Dubrovnik campaign. It is, thus, understandable 
why the current structures of power in Podgorica would like to avoid 
facing the past and dealing with its consequences. 
Uncertainty about the reactions of the international community with 
regard to the role Montenegrin and Serbian elites played in the breakup of 
the former Yugoslavia in general and the Dubrovnik campaign in 
particular might have been one of the reasons behind a recent series of 
public apologies issued by the current Montenegrin leadership and the 
president of Serbia and Montenegro, Svetozar Marovic.86 The first to 
apologize to the Croats was Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic. 
During his June 2000 meeting in Cavtat with Croatian President Stjepan 
Mesic, the Montenegrin prime minister expressed “regret for all the pain 
and material damage inflicted by any member of the Montenegrin 
people.”87 
Reactions in Serbia and Montenegro to Djukanovic’s apology varied. 
The former leader of the Montenegrin Socialist Democratic Party, Zarko 
Rakcevic, saw it as a “positive and wise step,” but reminded Djukanovic 
that he should also apologize to “citizens of Montenegro who were 
harassed because they opposed the pointless war with Croatia.”88 
Leaders of the Serbian opposition parties reacted differently to 
Djukanovic’s statement. Predrag Simic, advisor to Vuk Draskovic, 
President of the Serb Renewal Movement, interpreted it as the step of a 
politician who wants to “send the past into history and to create a new 
future for these two countries.”89 Democratic Party of Serbia President 
Vojislav Kostunica said that Djukanovic had “washed his hands of his 
participation in the war and tried to present himself as a completely 
different person, a completely Western man.”90 Kostunica also reminded 
the general public that Djukanovic “had created the Montenegrin and 
Yugoslav policy at the time and now he was trying to pretend it had been 
someone else.”91 
Three years later, in 2003, another Montenegrin “hawk” from the time 
of the War for Peace underwent a political catharsis similar to that of 
Djukanovic. In a rather theatrical manner, the current President of the 
newly formed state of Serbia and Montenegro, Svetozar Marovic, 
apologized to Croats and Bosnians for “all evil acts and wrongdoings” 
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committed against them by the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro.92 
Marovic then proceeded to apologize to those Montenegrins whom he, 
together with his party colleagues, Milo Djukanovic and Momir 
Bulatovic, persecuted to the full extent of the law twelve years ago.93  
While reports of these apologies and various assessments of their 
genuineness, or the lack thereof, filled the front pages of newspapers, an 
effort to destroy the evidence of past political actions and war mongering 
rhetoric seem to have been under way in Montenegro. The more radical 
example of the efforts to bury mistakes from the past is the vanishing of 
almost all the archival video material related to the Dubrovnik campaign 
and the role Montenegro played in this process from the archives of the 
Montenegrin State Television. Furthermore, numerous copies of the 
Montenegrin daily Pobjeda from 1991 have mysteriously disappeared from 
the shelves of the City Library in Podgorica.94  
The delay in completing the judicial proceedings in The Hague against 
former JNA officers accused of a breach of the Geneva Convention’s 
regulations and rules of war during this campaign has not helped the 
process of reconciliation at the local level. The longer the proceedings last 
the more the Montenegrin political elite behaves as a protected witness 
even though its responsibility for the Dubrovnik campaign is apparent. 
This, however, might also be a sign of Brussels’ pragmatic politics, since 
the importance of the Montenegrin political elite as a permanent witness 
on the witness-stand on behalf of the international community in the 
process of “proving” that the Balkan slaughterhouse was not an inter-
ethnic civil war but Greater Serbian aggression on the sovereign states of 
Croatia and Bosnia should not be underestimated. 
The “War for Peace” has turned out to be one of the most shameful 
episodes in recent Montenegrin history, and it has left a dark spot on the 
memory maps of many Montenegrins. As Nikola Samardzic pointed out, 
the onslaught on Dubrovnik “was an unjust war against Croatia, and a 
war in which Montenegro disgraced itself by putting itself in the service 
of the Yugoslav army and Slobodan Milosevic.”95  
With the benefit of hindsight it could be said that the ideological 
motivation behind this campaign, its military and political dynamics, and 
its obvious catastrophic results clearly prove that the operation’s true 
aims were twofold: to destroy as much as possible of the region on the 
Croatian coast, to pillage its towns and villages, and to implicate 
Montenegro and its citizens in a malevolent military campaign of 
territorial expansion designed by Greater Serbian nationalists in Serbia 
and Montenegro. Not unlike other nationalisms, Greater Serbian 
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nationalism needed to spill the blood of “others” so that all bridges 
connecting us with our neighbors would be burned down. It also needed to 
spill the blood of many Montenegrins as the final proof of a long-standing 
and long-lasting Serbian-Montenegrin unity. A few hundred citizens of 
Montenegro and Croatia paid the ultimate price for this political and 
military adventure. The graves of those Montenegrin citizens who gave 
their lives in this campaign are all but forgotten. Memories of those 
Montenegrins who died “at Dubrovnik” are no longer revered because of 
the terrible burden of guilt overshadowing the entire nation. They fell 
from grace even though they were the victims and not the creators of this 
danse macabre. 
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